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This paper examines the relationships between the chara teristics of 
networks of small scale entrepreneurs and their innovative 
performance in a developing country context. It is ba ed on a survey 
of entrepreneurs held in Uganda in May 2008. Networks represent 
social capital that can contribute to economic success and innovative 
performance. But sometimes networks can also act as obstacles to 
innovation. In the literature there are two opposing strands. The line 
of research initiated by Coleman points to the advantages of being 
embedded in tightly knit networks, which provide trus , support and 
access to innovation. Burt emphasizes the disadvantages and 
constraints of closed and dense networks, where many relationships 
are redundant and actors are isolated from the outside world. This 
paper applies these theories in a developing country setting, where 
they have so far not been studied. It provides an empirical synthesis 
between the Burt and the Coleman perspective. The relationship 
between network constraints and innovative performance is found to 
be curvilinear. Increasing density and constraint ii ially has positive 
effects on innovative performance, but beyond an optimum negative 
effects start to prevail. Network size and human capital have positive 





This paper examines the relationships between the chara teristics of networks of small 
scale entrepreneurs and their innovative performance i  the context of developing 
countries. Networks represent the social capital of n entrepreneur. This social capital is a 
potential resource that may enhance innovative performance. Under some conditions, 
however, networks can also act as an obstacle to inn vation. The aim of the paper is 
enhance our understanding of the potential contributions of social capital. It is a sequel to 
an earlier paper (Rooks and Szirmai 2009) which examined the substitutability of social 
and human capital in relation to economic performance and innovative performance. This 
paper is situated in the context of the debate betwe n Coleman who argues that dense 
networks will have a positive influence on innovation and Burt who argues that network 
constraints (redundant contacts in a dense network) will act as an obstacle to innovation. 
These issues are examined in a developing country context.  
 Hypotheses about the impacts of social capital are tested using data from a recent 
survey amongst Ugandan entrepreneurs held in May 2008. Uganda has a population of 
about 30 million people, of which some 40 per cent is still living in poverty. Uganda is an 
interesting case for the study of entrepreneurship, since it has been said to be one of the 
most entrepreneurial countries in the world. It hasa Total Entrepreneurial Average index 
(TEA) of 30% of the working population (Walter et al. 2004). Some 3.1 million people 
are estimated to be entrepreneurs, of which 65 per cent are males (Walter et al. 2003, 
2004). The business failure rate is reportedly high. On average, 30% of the entrepreneurs 
shut down their businesses within of the first 12 months of operation. Rooks and Szirmai 
(2009) found that the great majority of enterprises w re micro enterprises which showed 
little dynamism and growth. Of the total sample of 737 firms, only a small subset of 25-
40 firms qualified as dynamic Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. Thus, the kinds of 
innovation that are examined in this paper are minor novations which are new to the 
firm, rather than new to the market or new to the world. This is the context in which we 
are studying the determinants of innovative performance.  
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 In the last two decades there has been a surge of interest in the concept of social 
capital. Social capital has been used to explain a variety of topics, such as economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Akcomak and ter Weel, 2009), school performance 
(Coleman, 1988), firm dissolution (Pennings, Lee and Witteloostuijn, 1998), 
organizational advantage (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), entrepreurial success (Brüderl 
and Preisendörfer, 1998), innovation at the country level (Dakhli and De Clercq, 2003), 
and supplier performance (Raub, Rooks and Tazelaar, 2007). Within the social capital 
literature, we can distinguish two main strands: a macro strand focusing on characteristics 
of countries such as trust or levels of skill, expertis  and capabilities and a micro strand 
focusing on social capital embodied in social networks of economic actors. The micro 
concept of social capital has clear parallels with the economic concepts of human and 
physical capital. Like human capital or physical capit l, the creation, expansion and 
maintenance of networks requires investment of scarce resources such as time, energy or 
money  
 While the role of social networks and social capitl n entrepreneurship has been 
studied in the literature, the relationships between social capital and entrepreneurial 
innovation have been somewhat neglected. The focus f ocial network studies has 
mainly been on topics such as business and start up s ccess (Brüderl and 
Preisendörfer,1998; Anderson and Miller, 2003), the reproduction of network structure 
(Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997), the likelihood of starting up a business (Davidson and 
Honig, 2003), or the survival of an enterprise (Bosma et al., 2004). The role of social 
capital in innovative entrepreneurship has been less xtensively studied. An early 
exception is the study of biotechnology start-ups by Shan, Walker, and Kogut (1994) who 
predicted and found that the number of collaborative relationships that a firm had formed, 
was positively related to its innovation output.  
A second shortcoming of the literature on social capital and entrepreneurship is its 
focus on the advanced economies, while it has been argued that social capital is of special 
importance for developing countries (Woolcock, 1998). The neglect of developing 
countries is not restricted to the social capital lerature. It has been identified as a flaw in 
the entrepreneurship literature in general (Naudé 2007; Bruton, Ahstrom and Obloj, 
2008; Szirmai, Naudé and Goedhuys, forthcoming).  
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In the context of developing countries there has been extensive study of social capital 
in the form of family and kinship ties, but this has so far not been integrated in the 
modern literatures on networks and entrepreneurship. T e evidence on the role of family 
and kinship ties is mixed. On one hand, it is argued that kinship ties can be mobilised for 
capital accumulation, as is the case in East Asia (e.g. Perkins, 2000).,On the other hand 
the redistributive obligations within kinship networks in African and Middle Eastern 
countries are seen as acting as a drain on entrepreneurial resources and an obstacle for 
entrepreneurial dynamism (see early anthropological contributions such as Dorjahn, 
1962; Hunter, 1962; Khalaf, and Shwayri, 1966). 
In this study we try to address the three shortcomings, focusing on the effects of social 
capital on innovative performance of small scale entrepreneurs in Uganda.    
2 Theories and Concepts 
2.1 Social Capital 
Reflecting our increasing understanding of the processes of economic growth and 
development, the concept of capital has gradually been broadened over time. In the 
fifties, the emphasis was on physical capital accumulation and its contribution to 
economic growth. It turned out that physical capital accumulation left large portions of 
growth unexplained. In the sixties and seventies Denison, Schultz and Becker introduced 
the notion of human capital, where investment in the education and the quality of labour 
was seen as at least as important as investment in physical capital goods. In the nineties 
knowledge capital and R&D stocks were incorporated in the analysis of economic 
growth. Social capital is a further extension of this line of reasoning. 
Social capital originates in sociology and forms a potentially interesting bridge 
between the disciplines of economics and sociology. It refers to the social resources 
which can be drawn upon in the process of entreprenurship and production. Parallel to 
the emergence of the concept of social capital, economists started introducing terms such 
as ‘absorptive capacity’, ‘networks’ and ‘social capabilities’ which emphasized the social 
framework in which human, physical and knowledge capital can productively be 
employed. Social capital also drew our attention to the role of the entrepreneur, who had 
completely disappeared from sight in the black box of the modern economic production 
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function. In the Schumpeterian tradition, the entrepreneur is the key actor in economic 
development who creatively combines resources to create new economic activities, new 
products, new markets, new forms of organisation and new combinations of inputs. 
While human capital is by now widely accepted, the concept of social capital is still 
contested. Economists such as Arrow and Solow have questioned whether social relations 
are really forms of capital, since relationships are not the results of investment and are 
difficult to quantify in cost-benefit analysis. Other authors counter that this criticism 
might just as well be directed at human capital (e.g. Weslund and Bolton, 2003). Besides 
critical voices, there are those who celebrate social apital as a promising unifying 
concept. For instance, Woolcock (1998: 153-154) believ s that the concept of social 
capital can serve as a bridge between theories and disciplines “The idea of social capital 
is both appealing and promising precisely because it offers a potential strategy for 
obviating these concerns while bridging theoretical and disciplinary divides.” However, 
precisely the advantage of being a relatively broad, unifying and open concept has been 
also been mentioned as one of the main weaknesses of the concept, since social capital 
has so many different interpretations (see for reviews Woolcock, 1998; Portes, 1998; 
Adler & Kwon, 2000; Westlund & Bolton, 2003; Akçomak nd ter Weel, 2006).  
Definitions of social capital vary depending on whether they focus on the substance, 
the sources, or the effects of social capital. Some definitions focus attention on the macro 
level, indicating that trust and social capabilities influence the performance of regions 
and nations. Other definitions focus on the social apital of actors at micro level, with a 
focus on networks and social relationships. Definitio s also vary depending on whether 
they focus on relationships, the structure of the relationships or the type of relationships 
between people (e.g information relationships, personal relations, or economic 
relationships) (Adler & Kwon, 2000).  
 Although the definitions differ, many of them do have something in common 
(Akcomak, 2006). Social capital is mostly conceived as the possession of resources that 
are inherently associated with having a network of relationships. Those resources, which 
can be situated at the micro level, such as social support or access to venture capital, or at 
the macro level, such as norms and trust. Another common feature of definitions is that 
social capital does not only consist of the networks of social relationships themselves, but 
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also of the various kinds of resources that can potentially be mobilised through the social 
relationships. A third common feature is that indivi uals need to invest in social capital to 
generate future benefits. This feature is most obvious at the micro-level where it is clear 
that one needs to invest time and energy into the creation and maintenance of social 
relationships, even in the case of ‘inherited’ relationships like family relationships.1 
Finally, although one may think that more capital is always better, this need not always 
be the case for social capital. Social capital can h ve positive effects on economic and 
innovative performance, but it can also act as a constraint (negative social capital) 
 Our study can be situated in the micro tradition. We adopt a very general definition of 
social capital, that includes both `bridging' and `bonding' aspects of social capital. The 
bridging view focuses primarily on social capital as resources that are intrinsic to social 
networks which connect an actor to the outside world. Bridging forms of social capital 
are about an actor’s external linkages and the resou ces that can be accessed through 
these linkages. The bonding view focuses primarily on the internal characteristics of 
collective actors. In the bonding view the focus is more on a collectivity (which can be an 
enterprise, village, community and so on), and the social structure of that collectivity. 
Both perspectives generate interesting hypotheses about the effects of social capital.  
 Bourdieu was one of the first authors to give a systematic account of social capital. He 
defined it as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquantance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985: 248). As Portes (1998) notes this definition 
makes clear that social capital consists of two elem nts: first the network of the 
relationships which allows individuals to access reources possesed by their associates, 
and secondly the quantity and quality of resources possessed by member of a network.  
 Our view of social capital is best reflected in the definition of Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998: 243): "the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationship  possessed by an individual or 
                                                
1  Family relationships are inherited through the accident of birth. On first sight, the connection with 
investment in social capital is not immediately obvi us here. Nevertheless, even family relationships 
require a continuous investment of time, energy and other scarce resources for their maintenance and 
strengthening. If such investment is lacking, the mmbers of the network will be less able to draw on 
the various resources of family networks. Social capital will deteriorate. 
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social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be 
mobilized through that network."  
 In a previous paper (Rooks et al, 2009), we analysed the relationships between 
network resources and innovative behaviour. Our empirical analysis confirmed the 
theoretical expectation that there were signficant positive effects of network resources on 
innovative behaviour. In the present paper, we are specifically interested in the effects of 
the structural characteristics of networks and willnot include resource variables.2  
2.2 Entrepreneurship 
 
In the rapidly growing literature on entrepreneurship, two classes of definitions can be 
distinguished: functional definitions which focus on entrepreneurship as a form of 
creativity, irrespective of the type of organisation (privately-owned small firms, public 
organisations, foreign multinationals, publicly listed companies or non-profit 
organisations) and definitions focusing on a specific kind of actor, namely the owner- 
operator of a small or large enterprise (see Szirmai, Naude and Goedhuys, forthcoming). 
In this paper, we focus on the entrepreneur as owner-op rator. We analyse a sample of 
entrepreneurs who own and operate their own enterpris s (predominantly, small and 
micro enterprises).  
2.3 Innovative Performance 
The literature based on the increasing number of innovation surveys distinguishes three 
types of innovation: innovation new to the world, innovation new to the (domestic or 
local market) and innovation new to the firm (Fagerberg, 2005). In the context of micro-
enterprises in Uganda, innovative performance will predominantly refer to process, 
product or organisational innovations that are new to the firm. 
 
 
                                                
2    One needs to choose between these concepts, because in empirical reality network characteristics and
the resources   one can access through networks are strongly related. If one enters resource variables, the 
network structure variables become non-significant. Here we are specifically interested in these network 
chacteristics.  
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2.4 The Potential Benefits of Social Capital 
 
In order to develop hypotheses about the effects of social capital on innovative 
performance, we need to specify the different resources and benefits (and associated 
mechanisms) that are embedded in the network (altern tive formulation: can be 
mobilised). The first and most often mentioned benefit is access to information. Markets 
are often imperfect, because economic actors have only limited amounts of (often flawed) 
information at their disposal. Networks facilitate access to broader sources of information 
and improve information quality, relevance, and timeliness (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
Access to information through networks is one of the classic research topics in network 
research. The much cited classic article "Strength of weak ties" by Granovetter (19   ) is 
an example of a study of the effects of networks on knowledge of job opportunities. 
Networks also are helpful for gaining information about innovations (Burt, 1987; 
Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1966; Rogers, 2003; Kesidou and Szirmai, 2008), for the 
exhange of fine-grained information (Uzzi, 1997), for gaining information about 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Burt, 1992) or for information about mobility opportunities 
for newly arrived immigrant etnic entrepreneurs in the US (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 
1993).  
 A second type of network benefits consists of material resources. Power can be used 
to mobilise resources. On the one hand, actors that are located centrally in a network are 
believed to have greater power (Ibarra, 1993). Burt (1992) focuses on control or power 
benefits that are the result of structural holes in networks. Actors that are situated 
between otherwise disconnected groups have brokerage advantages. In this paper, we are 
not interested in power relationships a such, but in the use of power to mobilise material 
resources. The structural hole reasoning can thus be applied to material resources that can 
be mobilised through networks. 
 Access to resources can also be realised through mec anisms of solidarity, reciprocity 
and resource sharing. Networks that are very dense, or high in closure -  meaning that 
contacts of an entrepreneur have relationships amongst themselves - are thought to have 
strong compliance to social norms; trust is high. Individuals in dense networks tend to 
show more solidarity with each other (Coleman 1988; Ahuja, 2000).  
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 A third benefit of networks is the emotional and social support that is provided 
through the mechanisms of solidarity and reciprocity.  
 Social networks may also have a downside (Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1998; Portes, 1998; 
Gabbay & Leenders, 1999). Each contact in a network can be a source of conflict as well 
as harmony (Powell, 1990). The claims that network members have on each other may 
also act as a constraint for actors in general and for entrepreneurs in particular. Social ties 
give access to information, however in cases where economic actors have too many 
strong ties, this may lead to a form of social `blindness'. The network closes in on itself 
and becomes isolated from the outside world. Thus, Uzzi (1998) showed that firms that 
had embedded relations with other business enjoyed advantages such as trust, flexibility 
and fine-grained information transfer. However after a while, some of the business firms 
tended to become `overembedded'. They had very strong relations with only a relatively 
small number of suppliers and buyers. This made them vulnerable to exogenous shocks 
and deprived them of fresh market information. As a consequence those firms had lower 
survival rates than their less overembedded counterparts.  
 Networks also involve aspects of dependency and a loss of autonomy. Portes (1998) 
denominates the risk and liabilities of social networks as negative social capital, which he 
demonstrates with ethnic entrepreneurs. Social networks are initially critically important 
to ethnic entrepreneurship. An immigrant can compensate for a lack of physical and 
human capital via ethnic ties. Later on, the same ties prevent immigrant from breaking 
away into new markets and new social settings.  
In network theory the advantages and disadvantages of networks also come to the fore 
in the discussion between the network tradition of C leman and that of Burt. According 
to the Coleman tradition, dense, tightly knit networks are kind of social capital which is 
important for entrepreneurial success and entreprenurial innovation. According to the 
Burt tradition, too dense networks are replete with redundant contacts (constraints) which 
can act as obstacles to innovation. Actors in open n tworks with many structural holes 
will benefit from diverse information and will tend to be more innovative. We will 
develop this contrast further below in section 3.2.
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2.5 Overlapping Networks 
 
As indicated in the preceding sections, one can distinguish different types of networks 
which give access to different kinds of resources. We distinguish personal networks 
providing social and emotional support, information networks providing access to 
information and resource networks providing access to material resources. These 
different networks can overlap. This is particularly the case in a developing country 
context where the personal network can also be the network that provides information 
and access to reports. In a different terminology this is referred to as ‘interlocking 
markets’. When network overlap or multiplexity is very pronounced, this could also have 
negative effects on the freedom of the entrepreneur to ndertake risky types of innovative 




In this paper, we will use data from a recent survey h ld amongst small Ugandan 
entrepreneurs in 2008. Among others, this survey collected information on innovative 
performance and very detailed information about the social networks of the 
entrepreneurs. 
The questionnaire included questions about three diff rent types of entrepreneurial 
networks and their interrelationships. The first type of network is the network of personal 
relations. The second is the network of entrepreneurs who serve as information sources, 
the business advice or information network. The third is the network of entrepreneurs 
who potentially provide material support to the entr preneur, the business support 
network. For each of these types of networks, we have included questions about the 
resources which are accessed through the network. 
One could examine each of these networks separately. We will not do this in this 
paper. We merge the information about the three networks to construct the overall 
network of the entrepreneurs. However, we do use information about the people in the 
different networks to measure the degree of network multiplexity or overlap. 
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Subsequently, hypotheses about the relationships between network characteristics 
network characteristics (size, structure, multiplexity) and innovative performance.  
3.1 The Effects of Network Size on Innovative Performance 
 
Social capital is about having social relationships. Empirical research on entrepreneurial 
social capital often equates social capital with social network size. In the literature it is 
often assumed that the more social relations an entrepreneur has, the better the 
entrepreneur is connected, the more and better access the entrepreneurs has to 
information and other resources, and consequently the better the entrepreneur will 
perform. Strong relations between economic actors enabl  those firms to share 
knowledge and other resources. Moreover, in some cas s of close collaboration (for 
instance in the case of Research & Development projects), social relationships can create 
economies of scale (Ahuja, 2000).  
 With regard to information networks, our expectation s that network size is positively 
related to innovative performance. Each individual contact of an entrepreneur can be 
regarded as a channel of communication between that entrepreneur and many other 
indirect contacts (Mizruchi, 1989; Ahuja, 2000). The actors in the entrepreneur’s network 
each have their own knowledge and experience, which they have, at least partially, 
acquired through their relations with others (Gulati & Garguilo, 1999). It has been argued 
that the role of communication is especially important in the context of innovative 
activities (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Innovation requires knowledge and 
information. The relations in a network can be a means to collect and process 
information. Which new products or technologies are on the market? How promising are 
they?     
 The commercialization of an innovation or new idea also requires economic resources. 
In more dynamic economies venture capital and other forms of business finance will 
supply such resources for innovation. In the Ugandan setting of imperfect capital 
markets, networks may replace these institutions as sources of finance for the small scale 
and micro enterprise sector. 
 On the basis of the network literature we formulate the following general hypothesis 
with regard to network size.  
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Hypothesis 1: The larger the network size, the more innovative the entrepreneur will be. 
 
3.2 The Effects of Network Structure on Innovative Performance: 
Network Closure versus Structural Holes. 
 
In the literature there has been a debate about effects of network structure on business 
performance. According to one view dense networks, with many linkages between an 
entrepreneur’s relations, are to be preferred, because cooperation is facilitated in such 
networks. According to the other view more sparse networks with structural holes are 
preferable. Structural holes are gaps in the network structure: one’s contacts do not know 
each other. The holes in the network imply that since contacts are not acquainted, it is 
likely that they provide more diverse and heterogeneous information.  
 The view that dense networks are to be preferred is associated with Coleman (1988). 
Coleman argued that networks with closure are a source of social capital. In networks 
with closure everybody knows each other. In such close-knit dense networks, Coleman 
argues, social control occurs through sanctions. Those sanctions are “…agreed upon by 
an extended process of gossip and applied by individual actions, principally snubbing, 
shunning, ostracism, and insult.” (Coleman 1991: 11). Hence, gossip is a vehicle. 
Through gossip actors in a network create reputations and norms (Rooks, Snijders & 
Tazelaar, 2009; Macaulay, 19..). 
 As the anthropologist Merry (1984: 283) indicates.  
“Gossip flows most readily in highly connected, morally homogeneous 
social networks, and it is here that its impact is greatest. For gossip to 
occur, the two participants must know a third party in common. The more 
mutual friends they have, the more people they can discuss. Every 
individual is at the center of a network of people th y can discuss. The 
extent to which the members of this network know on another, independent 
of their relationship to ego, can be described as their “degree of 
connectedness.” Gossip flourishes in close-knit, highly connected social 
networks but atrophies in loose-knit unconnected ones.” 
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The development of shared norms can facilitate cooperation. In general the density of 
a social network improves the prospect of collective action (Marwell, Oliver and Prahl, 
1998). Dense, close-knit networks can solve knowledge sharing dilemmas, and hence 
greatly increase knowledge sharing between economic actors (Dyer and Noboeka, 2000). 
Through repeated interactions in such networks shared under-standings emerge that 
facilitate fine-grained information transfer (Uzzi, 1997). It has often been found that 
dense ties curbe opportunism (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 1995). Since innovation is an 
information demanding, and risky activity, based onthe arguments above, dense 
networks would foster innovative entrepreneurship. 
In the opposite perspective it is argued that social capital is a function of brokerage 
opportunities that are offered by structural holes in the network. Social capital is created 
by the absence of redundant relationships. Social capital is reduced by redundant 
relationships referred to as constraints. The basic argument is that within groups 
information tends to be more homogeneous than between groups. Having contacts in 
multiple groups thus yields certain information advntages. Hence, economic actors 
should prefer networks where many of their partners do not know each other. According 
to Burt (1992; 2000), the economic actor who is in between others, i.e. the tertius 
gaudius, is the entrepreneur in the literal sense. She is the person who adds value by 
brokering the connection between others. 
The evidence for positive effects of having networks with structural holes on 
performance is mainly based on intra-organizational research. Managers with sparse 
networks with many structural holes, have more valuable ideas (Burt, 2009). One study 
that directly tested effects of structural holes on innovation is Ahuja (2000), who studied 
innovation in the chemical industry. He found a negative effect of the amount of 
redundant contacts (constraints) on the number of patents that a firm produced.  
The density and constraint hypotheses are opposite poles of a single dimension. The 
more dense a network, the more constraints there will be. The more sparse a network, the 
less constraints there will be. This is confirmed by the high correlation between our 
operationalisations of density and constraint (see also Burt, 19  , p. ). Therefore, we do 
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not need to formulate separate hypotheses for density and constraint. Hypotheses 2 
couches the argument in terms of the degree of constrai t of a network. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the constraint of the network of an entrepreneur, the less  
   innovative the entrepreneur will be. 
 
We will also explore a non-linear version of this hypothesis, which argues that increasing 
the degree of constraint will have positive effects on innovative performance, up to some 
optimum, and negative effects beyond that optimum, when increasing constraint results 
in isolation of the group and the prevalence of ‘group think’. This results in hypothesis 3, 
which provides a synthesis between the Coleman and Burt theoretical perspectives. 
 
Hypothesis 3 : At lower levels of constraint, increas s in constraint are associated with 
increases in innovative performance. Beyond some optimum, increases in 
constraint are associated with decreases in innovative performance.  
3.3 Network Multiplexity and Innovative Performance 
 
Multiplexity is the degree to which the members of a network have multiple types of 
relations with each other: family and personal relations, financial relations, political 
relations, business relations and so forth. Multiplexity is about the degree to which 
network relationships are multidensionsal (Ibarra, 1995). In other words multiplexity is 
about network overlap: different types of network are concentrated in one person 
(Granovetter, 1973).   
 In the interlocking markets literature in development economics, it has often been 
argued that family and kinship relations play a pivotal role in many African micro 
enterprises Relatives are often business advisers, ources of finance, employees or 
employers. 
 Building on the previous theoretical discussion, we could identify the following 
possible impacts of multiplexity of networks. 1: if k n and information networks coincide, 
access to information will be less diverse/heterogeneous. As in the case of closed, highly 
constrained networks this should have a negative impact on innovative performance. 2: if 
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kinship and business networks coincide, redistributive kinship obligations are seen as 
acting as a drain on entrepreneurial resources and an obstacle for entrepreneurial 
dynamism and innovation This effect has been documented in anthropological studies of 
African and Middle Eastern entrepreneurship (see early contributions such as Dorjahn, 
1962; Hunter, 1962; Khalaf, and Shwayri, 1966).Thus, multiplexity should have a 
negative impact on innovative performance. 3. On the ot er hand Uzzi (1997), argues that 
multiplexity, allows for better and more `fine grained information transfer’. This 
reasoning reflects the network density social capital arguments which focus on trust, and 
shared values in dense networks. In contrast to the previous arguments, this line of 
reasoning suggests that entrepreneurs with multiplex networks will be more innovative 
rather than less. We formulate the hypothesis in negative terms, following arguments 1 
and 2. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the multiplexity of the relations of an entrepreneur, the less 
innovative the entrepreneur will be. 
 
4 Data and Operationalisations 
 
4.1 Data Collection and Sample 
 
To test our hypotheses we make use of a recent survey amongst Ugandan entrepreneurs 
held in May 2008. There are no adequate sampling frames of entrepreneurs available in 
Uganda. We therefore employed a sampling procedure based on the Global 
Entrepreneurship Survey approach for selecting respondents (See Walter 2003, 2004 for 
more details on the GEM in Uganda). For budgetary reasons the sample area was 
restricted to two districts in Central Uganda: Kampla, which is the capital city and 
leading commercial town of Uganda, and one more rural area, namely the Mpigi district, 
which is largely a rural .  
The sample was selected in a number of steps. First, in each district three parishes 
were randomly selected. In the next step local officials provided us with lists of 
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households, indicating in which households one (or more) of the member was an 
entrepreneur. From these lists 750 entrepreneurial households and a control group of 250 
non-entrepreneurial households were selected. The sel ction of households and 
subsequently the respondents within the households was done randomly. If there were 
more than one entrepreneurs within one household, the adult entrepreneurial family 
members were numbered according to their age, assigning number one to the oldest and 
the highest number to the youngest household member Th  respondent was selected 
according to a random number chosen from a random nu ber table: the second oldest 
person was selected if the random number chosen was a two, the fifth oldest if the 
random number was a five etc..  
Since in Uganda questionnaires cannot be mailed, faxed or couriered to respondents, 
the data had to be gathered via face-to-face interviews. The interviews were carried out 
by a team of 10 interviewers. All but one interviewer had extensive previous experience 
as an interviewer working for the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor projects of 2003 and 
or 2004. During the training, sampling procedures, translations of key terms in the 
questionnaires and handling of respondents was stresed. The interviewers were finally 
field tested to assess their ability to handle the data collection, before they embarked on 
the data collection exercise.  
The data collection took place in the first two weeks of May 2008. In almost all cases 
the selected respondent was willing to participate in the study. In Kampala there were 5 
refusals; in Mpigi two persons refused to participate. Hence, we reached an unusually 
high response percentage of about 99.3%. Each interview continued until the informant 
had completely described the above issues. On average an interview took 45-60 minutes. 
In total the sample consists of 993 respondents aged 16-64 years of which 737 were 
entrepreneurs and 256 were a control group of non-etrepreneurs. Since the goal of our 
analysis is to explain innovative entrepreneurship, all the non entrepreneurs are removed 
from the dataset. After the interview with a responde t, the interviewer answered six 
questions about the interview and the respondent. Based on this information 40 
observations were excluded: 17 observations because the interviewer seriously doubted 
the reliability of the answers of the respondent, 23 observations because the interviewer 
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indicated that the respondents had trouble understanding the questions. This leaves us 
with a sample of in total 697 entrepreneurs. 
 
4.2 Variables and Operationalisations 
 
4.2.1 Innovativeness 
To measure innovativeness we used a set of five dichotomous items that measured 
whether the entrepreneur had introduced or invested in new or improved products or 
processes (see Table 1). These items were adapted from the first South African 
Innovation Survey (Oerlemans et al. 2003; Rooks et al. 2005). Innovativeness in the 
Ugandan context of small enterprises obviously refers to activities new to the firm, rather 
than to the market or to the world. We used a non-parametric items response model, the 
Mokken model (a probabilistic version of the Guttman scale), to measure the scalability 






Mean, Range and Scalability Coefficient Mokken H for Items Measuring 
Innovativeness. 
Item Mean Range Mokken H 
In the last three years, have you invested resources 
to improve your (business) premises? 
0.49 0-1 0.54 
In the last three years, have you invested resources 
to improve your (business) machineries or tools? 
0.46 0-1 0.55 
In the last three years, has your business introduced 
products or services that were new or improved to 
the market? 
0.42 0-1 0.60 
In the last three years, have you improved your 
products or services? 
0.46 0-1 0.47 
Do you plan to change your product-mix or service-
mix within the next year? 
0.59 0-1 0.58 
 
 
                                                
3 A Mokken H between 0.4 and 0.5 is considered to be a medium strong scale, above 0.5 is considered to be
strong (Mokken and & Lewis, 1982; Meijer and Baneke, 2004). 
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4.2.2 Social Capital: Measurement of Network Characteristics and Network Resources 
 
To obtain network data we followed a standard survey m thod of collecting ego-centered 
network data (Marsden, 1990). We used name-generators nd interpreters to measure 
different aspects of the network of entrepreneurs. Multiple name-generators are more 
reliable than single name-generators when it comes to measuring the size and 
composition of the network (Marin & Hampton, 2007). 
 In the first name-generator we asked about personal contacts with the following 
question “From time to time, most people discuss important personal matters with other 
people. Looking back over the last six months – who are the people with whom you 
discussed an important personal matters?”. This provides indicators for respondents’ 
personal social capital. The second question was about contacts with whom business 
matters were discussed: “From time to time, entrepreneurs seek advice on important 
business matters. Looking back over the last six months – who are the people with whom 
you discussed an important business matter?”. This provides indicators for the 
informational social capital. The third question was bout business contacts that could 
provide material support: “If you were seeking materi l support for your business from 
other entrepreneurs. Looking back over the last six months – who are those 
entrepreneurs?”. This provides information about resource social capital. 
 For every name-generator question the respondent was asked to list names. The 
maximum number of names was five. Limiting the number of alters is a standard way to 
cope with time constraints in a survey, while mainti ing measurement precision and 
decreasing measurement bias (Burt, 1984: 315). There were a number of further 
questions about each person cited on the name-generator (i.e. alter-generator). Important 
questions referred to the frequency of contacts with each person and a list of possible 
resources that could be obtained from the cited conta t. We also asked questions about 
the relationships between each of these alters Thisgives us an idea of the density or 
constraint of the network. 
Using the information obtained from these name-generators we we able to constructed 
a network size measure and a constraint measure. Moreover using the information on the 
three networks we constructed a multiplexity measure.  
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4.2.3 Size of the Network 
The size of the network is simply the number of contacts mentioned by the respondent. 
Using this information we constructed three size variables: personal network size, 
informational network size, and resource network size.  
 
Size = n, 
where n is the absolute number of contacts 
4.2.4 Constraint 
Constraint is a summary measure of structural holes and brokerage. A network contact 
constrains ego’s entrepreneurial opportunities when an alter q, in whom ego has heavily 
invested, itself has invested heavily in alter j. Burt (1992:54) defines constraint as 
follows: 
 
“Contact j constrains your entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that: (a) you’ve 
made a large investment of time and energy to reach j, and (b) j is surrounded by few 
structural holes with which you could negotiate to get a favorable return on the 
investment”. 
Figure 1.  
An illustration of an ego-network of an entrepreneur 
 
Source: adapted from Burt, 1992. 
 
 Burt (1992) proposed the following formula to defin  the degree to which 
entrepreneur i is constrained by his or her contact with j :  
cij  = (pij + ∑q piqmqj)
2,  for q ≠ i,j.      (1) 
 
 21 
pij  is the proportion of entrepreneur i’s time and energy invested in contact j as a fraction 
of time invested in all contacts: 
 pij = zij / ∑j zij         (2) 
 
where 
z measures time/energy invested in a relationship  
piq is the proportion of i’s time and energy invested on c ntacts other than j 
mqj  indicates the strength of the relationship between q a d j expressed as a ratio relative 
to the strongest of q’s relationships with anyone in go’s network:  
 
mqj = zqj / max( zqj)         (3) 
 
where  
max(zqj) is the strongests of j’s relations with anyone in ego’s network (which implies 
that mqj  always has a value between 0 and 1).   
 
Equation 1 indicates the extent to which  is wasting his time in cultivating a redundant 
contact j 
 
In our study, network constraint is the sum of all the constraints in the ego-network:  
 
∑j (pij + ∑q piqmqj)
2         (4) 
 
To measure p, the proportion of time spent with a certain alter (quation 2), we make use 
of a question about the time spent with a certain alter (“How often do you speak with 
contact? Daily, weekly, or monthly? ”). To measure m, relative strength of the relation, 
we make use of a question about the strength of the relation between two alters (“Please 
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think about the relationships between the people you just mentioned. For each contact, 
ask if this contact is a strangers, close, or especially lose to the other persons.”4) 5  
4.2.5 Multiplexity 
Multiplexity is the degree to which different kinds of contacts in a network overlap. In 
our study we are primarily interested in the degree to which business and personal 
relationships overlap. We constructed a variable multiplexity that indicates the degree of 
overlap between business relations (i.e. information relationships and resource 
relationships) are also personal relationships.6 In the interview, we could check for every 
business relationship whether or not it was also mentioned as a personal relationship. The 
variable multiplexity is the number of times that a business relation was said to be a 
personal relation as well, divided by the total number of business relations. Hence 
multiplexity is 0 if no relations overlap, and 1 if all business relations are personal 
relationships as well.  
 
4.2.6 Control Variables 
To control for possible confounding effects we included a number of control variables.  
 
Age 
                                                
4 In the pre-test it became apparent that the category friend was confusing for the respondents, if there was 
a relation between alters they were always friends. We therefore decided to use the close and very close 
categories.  
5 An alternative formula provide by Burt measures for the degree to which entrepreneur i is constrained by 
his contact with j as cij = (pij +
 
∑q piqpqj)
2, for q ≠ i,j, where pqj is the proportion of alter q’s time and energy 
invested in contact j, instead of mqj, which represents the relative strength of the relation. We cannot 
accurately estimate pqj
 because we have no information about the contacts of he alters external to the 
entrepreneurs ego-network.  Also, the chosen specification is preferable because it correlates very highly 
with density measures, so that density and constrait form a common dimension (See  for this correlation 
Burt, 1992, pp. ). 
6 We focus on the business-personal relation overlap, there are more possible overlaps between networks, 
for instance between the business advice and the mat rial resource network, however these overlaps are not 
our main research interest.   
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Age has been found to be a factor in the probability of establishing a business. As 
individuals grow older, they are less likely to invest in the activities necessary to start a 
new enterprise.  
Gender 
 In most countries gender has been found to be a significant factor in the probability of 
establishing a business. To control for this we included a dummy variable gender (female 
= 1, male = 0). 
Rural versus urban region 
To control for possible confounding effects of the sample regions we included a dummy 
variable rural (rural region = 1; urban region = 0) .  
Economic Sector 
We constructed three dummies for economic sectors: customer services, agriculture and 
manufacturing, with the trade and services sector as the reference category.  
5 Results 
 
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables defined 
above. 
 
Table 2: Mean, Standard deviation and correlations of the study variables. 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Innovative 
Performance 
2.39 1.89 -          
2.Constraint 1.61 0.89 .16 -         
3.Multiplexity 0.51 0.43 -
.15 
.31 -        
4.Number of alters  3.95 2.29 .28 .61 -
.21 
-       
5.Years of education 8.81 3.70 .21 .09 .00 .16 -      




-     






.10 -    
8.region (rural = 1) 0.49 0.50 .19 .25 -
.06 
.38 .07 .09 -
.06 
-   



































Table 3 presents four different specifications of our regression model. The difference 
between model 2 and model 1 is that we add a square term for our constraint variable. 
The difference between model 3 and model 2 is that we add the multiplexity variable. In 
model 4, we add the size variable. Our preferrred specification is model 4. 
 
Table 3: Network Determinants of Innovative Performance 
(standardized regression coefficients; t-value betwe n brackets) 






















Number of alters (network 
size)    
0.01 
(0.20) 











































































R2 0.14 0.18 0.20 .20 
~ = p < .01 ; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
 
Regression diagnostics 
The ordinary least squares regression model assumes that independent variables and the 
error term in the regression model are statistically independent. If this assumption is not 
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met, parameter estimates may not be consistent. Since social networks are, at least partly, 
the results of choices of entrepreneurs, constraint may be conceived as an endogenous 
variable. We tested for endogeneity using an augmented regression test (Davidson & 
MacKinnon, 1993), and a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). As our instrumental variables 
we used two variables, i.e. married or not and the proportion of kin in the network, that 
do not correlate with innovativeness, while they did correlate with constraint. The result 
of the Hausman test as well as the augmented regression test showed that in our case 
constraint can be treated as an exogenous variable, so that endogeneity poses no 
problems.  
 To check the robustness of our results we performed a number of regression 
diagnostics. We identified four influential data points. Removing them did not 
substantially alter the results, most of the coefficients became slightly more significant. 
We found no signs of heteroskedasticy of the residuals. However a normal probability 
plot revealed that the distribution of the residuals s ightly deviates from a normal 
distribution. We checked for multicollinearity: no problems were detected.  
 We used 10 interviewers to collect the data. We chcked whether interviewer bias 
could have affected the results. We did this by including 9 interviewer dummies in the 
analysis. The results were not affected. All the cofficients that were significant in table 3 
remained significant and the signs remained unchanged, though some of the standard 
errors of coefficients did show some increase.    
 
Interpretation 
The most important findings are as follows: 
 Network size has a significant positive effect on in ovative performance. Larger 
networks are beneficial for entrepreneurial innovation. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis 1. 
 Constraint has a positive and significant coefficient, while the coefficient of constraint 
squared is significant and negative. This is a very important result. It indicates that at first 
increasing constraint has a positive effect on innovative performance. This is in line with 
the Coleman hypothesis that social capital is positively related to entrepreneurial 
innovation. However beyond an optimum level of constraint, negative effects set in. The 
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more constraint there is, the less innovative the entrepreneur will be. This is in line with 
the Burt hypothesis that constrained networks have negative effects on entrepreneurial 
performance and innovation. Thus, specification 4 provides a synthesis between two 
approaches which so far have been contrasted in the literature. This finding confirms our 
third and most important hypothesis. The curvilinear relation between constraint and 
innovative performance is illustrated in figure 2, which derives directly from our 
empirical data and represents the relationship between constraint (horizontal axis) and 
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The results with regard to multiplexity form a further support for this line of reasoning. 
Multiplex networks do not favour innovation. Entrepneurs who are too strongly tied up 
in networks where personal and business relationships are intertwined, have less scope 
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for innovation. This is an important finding in the context of developing countries, where 
such multistranded relationships are more prevalent than in advanced economies. 
 With regard to the control variables, it is worth mentioning that education is highly 
significant in all specifications. As is well known, human capital is one of the 
determinants of innovative performance. Higher schooling of entrepreneurs creates more 
scope for innovation. Female entrepreneurs tend to be less innovative than male 
entrepreneurs. Somewhat unexpected is the finding that rural entrepreneurs are more 
innovative than urban entrepreneurs. 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this study we examined the influence of network characteristics on entrepreneurial 
innovativeness amongst small scale entrepreneurs in Uga da. The analysis is based on a 
tailored survey held in May 2008. The survey included detailed questions about networks 
which allow us to chart the network characteristics of the entrepreneurs and 
operationalise complex theoretical concepts.  
 Our results provide a synthesis between two opposing trands of literature: the social 
capital tradition and the structural holes tradition. The social capital tradition, associated 
with the name of Coleman, hypothesizes positive relationships between network density 
and the performance of entrepreneurs. The structural holes tradition associated with Burt 
hypothesizes negative effects of network constraints on entrepreneurial behaviour. We 
examine these hypotheses in relation to the innovative performance of entrepreneurs. We 
find a curvilinear relation between constraint and innovation. In this curvilinear 
relationship, social capital effects dominate at lower levels of constraint and structural 
constraint effects at higher levels. This is a plausible finding. Entrepreneurs need to be 
embedded in networks in order to be able to innovate. But, as networks become denser, 
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Annex: Gestation Activities 
 
This annex presents the results of regressions with gestation activities as the dependent 
variable. Gestation activities provide an indicator of the successful exploitation of a start 
up and are as such associated with innovativeness. We use a set of five dichotomous 
items that measure gestation behaviors to create a scale for gestation activities (see Table 
4). The Mokken model, a non-parametric items respon model indicated that the items 
constitute a strong scale (Mokken H = 0.62).  
 
Annex Table 1:  
Mean, Range and Scalability Coefficient Mokken H for Items Measuring Gestation 
Activity. 
Item Mean Range Mokken H 
Have you prepared a business plan? 0.44 0-1 0.69 
Is your plan written informally for internal use? 0.43 0-1 0.65 
Is your plan written formally for external use? 0.06 0-1 0.71 
Have you purchased any major items like 
equipment, facilities or property? 
0.55 0-1 0.57 
Have you developed projected financial statements 
(such as income and cash flow statements)? 
0.37 0-1 0.54 
 
 
The regressions with gestation activities as dependet variable are reproduced in Annex 
Table 2. It is encouraging that the regressions with this alternative dependent variable 
perfectly confirm the results in the main text. Constraint has a positive coefficient, 
constraint squared a negative coefficient, multiplexity a negative coefficient, size a 
positive coefficient and human capital a positive co fficient. 
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Annex Table 2 
Network Characteristics and Gestation activities 
(standardized regression coefficients; t-value betwe n brackets) 



















Number of alters     0.17** 
(3.14) 









































































R2 0.24 0.25 .26 .27 
~ = p < .01 ; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
 
 
